



PAYING FOR LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE 
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Firms, investors, and regulators around the world are now seeking to ensure 
that the compensation of public company executives is tied to long-term results, 
in part to avoid incentives for excessive risk taking.  This Article examines how 
best to achieve this objective.  Focusing on equity-based compensation, the prima-
ry component of executive pay, we identify how such compensation should best be 
structured to tie pay to long-term performance.  We consider the optimal design 
of limitations on the unwinding of equity incentives, putting forward a pro-
posal that firms adopt both grant-based and aggregate limitations on unwind-
ing.  We also analyze how equity compensation should be designed to prevent 
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the gaming of equity grants at the front end and the gaming of equity disposi-
tions at the back end.  Finally, we emphasize the need for widespread adoption 
of limitations on executives’ use of hedging and derivative transactions that 
weaken the tie between executive payoffs and the long-term stock price that well-
designed equity compensation is intended to produce. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators, firms, and inves-
tors are seeking to put in place executive pay arrangements that avoid 
rewarding executives for short-term gains that do not reflect long-term 
performance.  This Article seeks to contribute to these efforts by ana-
lyzing how pay arrangements can and should best be tied to long-term 
performance.  Our analysis focuses on equity-based compensation, the 
most important component of executive pay arrangements. 
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In our 2004 book, Pay Without Performance:  The Unfulfilled Promise 
of Executive Compensation, we warned that standard executive pay ar-
rangements were leading executives to focus excessively on the short 
term, motivating them to boost short-term results at the expense of 
long-term value.1  The crisis of 2008–2009 has led to widespread rec-
ognition that pay arrangements that reward executives for short-term 
results can produce incentives to take excessive risks.  Leading public 
officials, such as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke2 and Trea-
sury Secretary Timothy Geithner,3 as well as top business leaders such 
as Goldman Sachs’s CEO Lloyd Blankfein,4 have all emphasized the 
importance of avoiding such flawed structures.  
 Recognition of the significance of the problem has generated sub-
stantial interest in fixing it.  Treasury Secretary Geithner has urged cor-
porate boards to “pay top executives in ways that are tightly aligned with 
the long-term value and soundness of the firm.”5  The Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) bill,6 subsequent legislation amending TARP,7 
and the Treasury regulations implementing TARP8 all required the eli-
1 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE UNFUL-
FILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ch. 14 (2004) (analyzing problems re-
sulting from the broad freedom of executives to unload equity incentives); see also Ri-
chard Bernstein, Vindication for Critic of C.E.O. Pay, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 18, 2009, 
at 2, available at 2009 WLNR 11595028 (arguing that the analysis in our book was vin-
dicated by the subsequent financial crisis).  
2 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Independent Community Bankers of America’s National Convention 
and Techworld (Mar. 20, 2009), transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20090320a.htm (“[P]oorly designed compensation poli-
cies can create perverse incentives . . . . Management compensation policies should be 
aligned with the long-term prudential interests of the institution, be tied to the risks 
being borne by the organization, . . . and avoid short-term payments for transactions 
with long-term horizons.”).  
3 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner on Compensation ( June 10, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/ 
releases/tg163.htm (“[C]ompensation should be structured to account for the time hori-
zon of risks.”). 
4 See Lloyd Blankfein, Do Not Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
2009, at 13 (“An individual’s performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid 
excessive risk-taking.”).  
5 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 3. 
6 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5221(b)(2) (Supp. II 2009). 
7 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, sec. 
7001, § 111, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (amending section 111(b) of the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act). 
8 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restric-
tions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ 
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mination of incentives to take “unnecessary and excessive risks” in firms 
receiving TARP funds.  The Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for 
Compensation and Corporate Governance, which appointed Kenneth 
Feinberg as the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, in-
structed Feinberg to focus on tying pay to long-term performance.9  The 
Treasury’s plan for financial regulatory reform called on federal regula-
tors to issue standards for all financial firms to avoid excessive risks,10 
and a bill recently passed by the House of Representatives requires reg-
ulators to adopt such standards.11  In the meantime, regulators have 
been moving on their own in this direction:  the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors requested comments on a proposed guidance contem-
plating the scrutiny of pay arrangements by banking supervisors,12 and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) requested com-
ments on a proposal to raise deposit insurance rates for banks whose 
compensation arrangements create excessive incentives to take risks.13 
At the international level, the Basel II framework has been recent-
ly amended to require banking regulators to monitor compensation 
structures with a view to aligning them with good risk management.14  
At their September 2009 meeting, the G-20 leaders “committed to act 
together to . . . implement strong international compensation stan-
press/releases/tg15.htm (describing the Treasury guidelines promulgated under the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act). 
9 See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 
28,394 ( June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30) (establishing guidelines for 
executive compensation at firms receiving TARP assistance). 
10 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:  A NEW FOUN-
DATION 28 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_ 
web.pdf (outlining the Obama Administration’s recommendations to reform and re-
structure the financial regulatory system); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Trea-
sury, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner Written Testimony House Financial Services 
Committee Hearing (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ 
tg71.htm (“[R]egulators must issue standards for executive compensation practices 
across all financial firms . . . [that] encourage prudent risk-taking . . . and should not oth-
erwise create incentives that overwhelm risk management frameworks.”). 
11 See Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, 
H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. § 4(b) (2009) (“[R]egulators shall jointly prescribe regulations 
that prohibit any incentive-based pay arrangement . . . [that] encourages inappropriate 
risks.”). 
12 Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 
55,227 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009).  
13 Incorporating Employee Compensation Criteria into the Risk Assessment Sys-
tem, 75 Fed. Reg. 2823 (proposed Jan. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327). 
14 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II 
FRAMEWORK paras. 84-94 (2009) (providing guidance on measures that would enhance 
sound compensation practices, such as decoupling compensation from short-term 
profit and actively monitoring the compensation system’s operation). 
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dards aimed at ending practices that lead to excessive risk-taking.”15  
The U.K. Financial Services Authority has adopted regulations aimed 
at ending such practices,16 and other countries have been moving or 
considering moves in such a direction.17 
While there is thus widespread recognition that improving execu-
tives’ long-term incentives is desirable, there is much less agreement as 
to how this should be accomplished.  The devil here, not surprisingly, is 
in the details.  In this Article, building on our earlier work, we seek to 
contribute to pay-arrangement reform by providing a framework and a 
blueprint for tying executives’ equity-based compensation—the primary 
component of their pay packages—to long-term performance. 
Part I analyzes how executives should be encouraged to focus on 
the long term rather than the short term.  The key principle should be, 
as we argued in Pay Without Performance,18 that managers must hold a 
large fraction of their equity after it vests.  The analysis in Part I focuses 
on the optimal design of limitations on unwinding.  We argue against 
the proposal that executives should be prevented from unwinding equi-
ty incentives until their retirement.  Tying the freedom to cash out to 
retirement, we show, can distort executives’ decisions to retire as well as 
undermine their incentives to focus on long-term value when approach-
ing retirement.  Instead, we put forward unwinding limitations de-
signed to prevent executives from attaching excessive weight to short-
term prices without creating perverse incentives to retire.  An executive 
receiving an equity-based grant should not be free to unwind the re-
ceived equity incentives for a specified period of time after vesting, after 
which she should be permitted to unwind the equity only gradually.  In 
addition, an executive’s unwinding of shares should be subject to ag-
15 See Leaders’ Statement:  The Pittsburgh Summit pmbl., para. 17, at 2 (2009), 
available at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/documents/organization/129853.pdf. 
16 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., REFORMING REMUNERATION PRACTICES IN FINANCIAL SER-
VICES app. 1 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps09_15.pdf (dis-
cussing a new framework to regulate the compensation practices of the financial ser-
vices industry, including requirements to establish remuneration policies consistent 
with and promoting effective risk management, along with increasing supervisory focus 
on remuneration). 
17 See, e.g., SWISS FIN. MKT. SUPERVISORY AUTH. (FINMA), REMUNERATION SYS-
TEMS:  MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR REMUNERATION SYSTEMS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
paras. 23, 27, 30 (2010), available at http://www.finma.ch/e/regulierung/Documents/ 
finma-rs-2010-01-e.pdf (requiring transparent, long-term-based remuneration schemes, 
independent control over the implementation of these schemes, and the structuring of 
remuneration to enhance risk awareness). 
18 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 174-79. 
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gregate limits on the fraction of the executive’s portfolio of equity in-
centives that the executive may unwind in any given year. 
Part II describes how executive compensation arrangements 
should be structured to prevent various types of “gaming” that work to 
increase executive pay at public shareholders’ expense and, in some 
cases, worsen executives’ incentives:  so-called “springloading” (using 
inside information to time equity grants); selling on inside informa-
tion; and the manipulation of the stock price around equity grants 
and dispositions.  We discuss how to control both gaming at the “front 
end”—when equity is granted—and gaming at the “back end”—when 
equity is cashed out. 
At the front end, the timing of equity grants should not be discre-
tionary, and equity awards should be made only on certain prespecified 
dates.  In addition, the terms and value of equity grants should not be 
linked to the grant-date stock price, which can easily be manipulated.  
The combination of these two steps at the front end would substantially 
reduce both springloading and stock-price manipulation around equity 
grants.  At the back end, we propose arrangements that would reduce 
executives’ ability and incentive to time dispositions based on inside in-
formation, as well as reduce executives’ ability and incentive to manipu-
late the stock price around the time of disposition.  Executives could be 
required to announce their intentions to unwind equity in advance.  
Firms could also use “hands-off” arrangements under which an execu-
tive’s vested equity incentives are automatically cashed out according to 
a schedule specified when the equity incentives are initially granted. 
Finally, Part III advocates that firms adopt arrangements designed 
to ensure that executives cannot easily evade the proposed arrange-
ments—both those that require executives to hold equity for the long 
term and those that prevent gaming.  Deploying arrangements that 
are desirable in theory will have little effect if they can be easily cir-
cumvented in practice.  We therefore explain the importance of plac-
ing robust restrictions on the use of any hedging or derivative transac-
tion that would enable executives to profit, or would protect them, 
from declines in their company’s stock price. 
During the course of our analysis in Parts I through III, we distill 
our conclusions into eight “principles.”  In an Appendix, we assemble 
them into a list of eight principles for tying equity-based compensa-
tion to long-term performance. 
Before proceeding, we would like to comment on the scope of our 
analysis and note several issues that fall outside of it. To begin, our 
analysis focuses on equity-based compensation and does not extend to 
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bonus compensation, which also needs to be reformed to prevent ex-
ecutives from attaching excessive weight to short-term results. As for 
equity-based compensation, we do not analyze the elements of long-
term shareholder value for which executives should and should not be 
rewarded.  Thus, we do not consider here whether executives should 
be paid with restricted stock or options, or the extent to which the 
payoffs from these equity instruments should be designed to filter out 
changes in the stock price that are due to market-wide or industry-
wide fluctuations. Our focus is on ensuring that, whatever equity in-
centives are used, their payoffs are primarily based on long-term stock 
values rather than on short-term gains that may be reversed.   
We should also emphasize that our analysis focuses on the com-
pensation arrangements of firms’ top executives.  For lower-level ex-
ecutives with responsibility over units whose performance does not 
have a substantial effect on the firm’s stock price, bonus compensa-
tion (whether provided in cash or in stock) provides the most effective 
way to tie compensation to long-term results.  For top executives, 
however, equity-based compensation provides an effective way to link 
pay to performance, and such compensation is in fact a primary com-
ponent of their pay packages.  Reforming the pay arrangements of 
these top executives in the ways proposed by this Article would thus 
substantially improve their incentives to focus on the firm’s long-term 
performance.  Furthermore, to the extent that a firm’s top executives 
have substantial influence on the pay structures of lower-level execu-
tives, improving top executives’ pay arrangements in the ways we dis-
cuss below will indirectly contribute to improving lower-level execu-
tives’ pay structures as well.  In particular, when top executives’ 
compensation is tied to long-term shareholder value, these executives 
will have a powerful incentive to adopt arrangements that similarly tie 
lower-level executives’ pay to long-term shareholder value.19 
19  We assume, for purposes of this Article, that the long-term stock price reflects 
the cash flow to shareholders over time and that it is thus appropriate to tie executive 
pay to the long-term stock price.  However, to the extent the firm engages in share re-
purchases or equity issuances, the long-term stock price will not accurately reflect the 
cash flow to shareholders over time.  For an analysis of this problem and how the pro-
posals of this Article need to be adjusted to address it, see generally Jesse M. Fried, 
Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay (Feb. 
2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
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I.  LIMITATIONS ON UNWINDING EQUITY INCENTIVES 
The problem we identified in Pay Without Performance is that many 
standard features of pay arrangements have failed to provide manag-
ers with desirable incentives to generate value.20  Indeed, they have of-
ten produced perverse incentives to act in suboptimal, value-reducing 
ways.  One important example:  pay arrangements have rewarded ex-
ecutives for short-term results that do not necessarily reflect long-term 
performance and that may in fact be generated at the expense of 
long-term value. 
Consider an executive who expects to be rewarded at the end of a 
given year based on performance measures tied to the stock price at 
the end of that year.  This compensation structure may lead to two 
types of undesirable behavior.  First, managers may take actions that 
boost the stock price in the short run, even if such actions would de-
stroy value in the long run.  For example, executives may enter into 
transactions that improve the current bottom line but create large la-
tent risks that could cripple the firm in the future.  Second, managers 
may engage in financial manipulation or other forms of “window 
dressing” that do not build firm value merely to pump up short-term 
prices.  In both cases, executives receive higher pay even though they 
fail to build firm value.  And in the first scenario, executives receive 
more pay even though they destroy firm value.  Thus, rewarding ex-
ecutives for short-term results not only fails to serve the goal of en-
couraging executives to improve firm performance—it can actually 
work in the opposite direction. 
Equity compensation arrangements should, therefore, provide ex-
executives with incentives to maximize long-term value, not the short-
term stock price.  But how should this be achieved?  Section I.A begins 
by emphasizing the value of imposing limits on the unwinding of 
vested equity incentives—that is, of separating the time at which execu-
tives become free to unwind equity incentives from the time at which 
such incentives vest.  Section I.B explains that requiring executives to 
hold their equity until retirement, as some have proposed, would 
create undesirable incentives.  Sections I.C and I.D put forward a bet-
ter approach.  In particular, we discuss the value and optimal design of 
grant-based limitations on unwinding in Section I.C and aggregate li-
mitations on unwinding in Section I.D. 
20 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 174-85 (identifying various incentive 
problems that current pay arrangements produce). 
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A.  Separating Vesting and Freedom to Unwind 
Executive compensation arrangements usually include stock op-
tions, restricted stock, or a combination of the two.  Under a typical 
stock option plan, a specified number of options vests each year as 
compensation for that year’s work.  Such a vesting schedule encou-
rages an executive to remain with the firm.  Once options vest—i.e., 
once they are “earned”—the options typically remain exercisable for 
ten years from the grant date.  However, standard arrangements allow 
executives to exercise the options and sell the underlying shares im-
mediately upon the vesting of their options. 
Restricted stock grants operate in much the same manner as stock 
option plans.  The stock is called “restricted” because executives do 
not own the stock outright when it is granted.  Rather, ownership of 
the stock vests over time, in part to give the executive an incentive to 
stay on the job.  When the vesting period ends, the restricted shares 
“belong” to the executive and, as in the case of options, executives are 
generally free to cash them out. 
Not surprisingly, executives take full advantage of their freedom to 
unload equity incentives after vesting.  For example, executives com-
monly exercise stock options years before they expire, and they imme-
diately sell almost all of the shares they acquire through option exer-
cises.21  As a result, executives are frequent sellers of their firms’ stock.22 
As we explained in Pay Without Performance, such early unwinding 
imposes two types of costs on shareholders.23  First, the corporation 
must give the unwinding executive fresh equity grants to replenish her 
holdings; otherwise, the executive’s incentive to generate shareholder 
value will be diminished.24  These replenishment grants economically 
dilute current public shareholders’ holdings by reducing their frac-
tional ownership of the corporate pie.  If executives were unable to 
unwind their stock and options so quickly after vesting, the cost of 
replenishing executives’ equity positions would be lower. 
Second, and more importantly for our focus in this Article, the abil-
ity to sell equity shortly after vesting leads executives to focus excessively 
21 See id. at 176-77 (noting studies that demonstrate executives’ widespread free-
dom to unwind early and executives’ tendency to exercise their options and sell the 
underlying shares well before the options’ expiration). 
22 Cf. Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pre-
trading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 317-27 (1998) (surveying evidence of insider 
trading by corporate executives).  
23 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 175. 
24 Id. 
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on short-term prices—the prices at which they can unload their shares 
and options.25  At any given point in time, executives may have accumu-
lated—and wish to unload—a large number of vested shares or options.  
Once executives have decided to sell large amounts of stock, they might 
find it in their interest to increase the short-term stock price, even if 
doing so would reduce the corporation’s long-term value.26 
Both of the costs associated with unwinding can be mitigated by 
the approach we advocated in Pay Without Performance :  separating the 
time that most of the restricted stock or options can be cashed out 
from the time that the equity vests.27  By requiring an executive to 
hold the equity for a longer period of time, the board will not need to 
replenish that executive’s holdings as frequently.  This, in turn, will 
reduce the cost to shareholders of maintaining the executive’s equity 
ownership at an adequate level.  More importantly for the purposes of 
this Article, this requirement will reduce the executive’s incentive to 
focus on the short term since the payoff from her equity will depend 
on stock prices in the long run. 
Although the end of the vesting period and the earliest cash-out 
date are almost always the same under current option and restricted 
stock plans, there is no reason for the two dates to be identical.  As 
soon as an executive has completed an additional year at the firm, the 
restricted stock or options that were promised as compensation for 
that year’s work should vest:  they should belong to the executive even 
if the executive immediately leaves the firm.  But the fact that the eq-
uity is now the executive’s to keep does not mean that the executive 
should be able to cash out all the equity immediately. 
Under current tax rules, an executive may be liable for taxes upon 
the vesting of certain equity incentives.28  In such circumstances, it may 
well be desirable to permit the executive to cash out enough of the 
vested equity incentives to pay the taxes arising from vesting.  Cashing 
out vested equity incentives solely to pay taxes would not result in the 
executive’s pocketing any cash; the executive’s ultimate payoff would 
continue to depend on the stock’s value down the road. 
 
25 See id. at 175-76. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. at 175. 
28 For example, the vesting of restricted stock generally gives rise to a tax liability.  
See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2006) (triggering tax liability when “the rights of the person having 
the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substan-
tial risk of forfeiture”). 
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This leads us to: 
 
PRINCIPLE 1:  Executives should not be free to unload restricted stock and 
options as soon as they vest, except to the extent necessary to cover any taxes 
arising from vesting. 
 
As we will explain in Part II, allowing executives to time their sales 
gives executives incentives to engage in two types of gaming:  trading 
on inside information and manipulating the stock price before a large 
sale.  Thus, if a tax liability arises from the vesting of equity awards, the 
executive should not be given discretion over when she sells the equity 
necessary to cover that liability.  Instead, the firm should withhold 
enough shares (based on the vesting-date price) to cover the execu-
tive’s taxes.  Alternatively, the executive could be permitted to sell that 
amount of equity back to the firm at the vesting-date price.  In either 
case, the executive would have little incentive or ability to engage in 
the gaming that can occur when executives are permitted to choose 
the precise time at which they unwind their equity. 
B.  The Problem with Retirement-Based Holding Requirements 
If, as we propose, cash-out dates are separated from vesting dates, 
the length of the “blocking” period between vesting and cash-out must 
be determined.  Some commentators and shareholder activists have 
proposed that firms link the cash-out date to retirement.29  Such an 
29 See “Hold Through Retirement”:  Maximizing the Benefits of Equity Awards While Mini-
mizing Inappropriate Risk Taking, CORP. EXECUTIVE, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 1, 3 [hereinafter 
“Hold Through Retirement”] (listing the benefits of retirement-based policies); Sanjai 
Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation:  Focusing and Committing to 
the Long-Term 1 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Pol-
icy, Research Paper No. 374, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336978 
(“[E]xecutive incentive compensation plans should consist only of restricted stock and 
restricted stock options, restricted in the sense that the shares cannot be sold or the 
option cannot be exercised for a period of at least two to four years after the execu-
tive’s resignation or last day in office.” (emphasis omitted)); Press Release, AFSCME, 
AFSCME Employees Pension Plan Announces 2009 Shareholder Proposals ( Jan. 27, 
2009), available at http://www.afscme.org/press/24815.cfm (reporting AFSCME’s 
shareholder proxy proposals calling for “hold through retirement” compensation 
schemes requiring executives “to retain a significant percentage of shares acquired 
through equity compensation programs for two years past their termination of em-
ployment with a company”); see also Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik & Yu-
liy Sannikov, Dynamic Incentive Accounts (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Pa-
per No. 7497, 2009), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP7497.asp (propos-
ing “incentive accounts” with state-dependent balancing and time-dependent vesting 
that continues for a specified period after retirement). 
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approach would block executives from unwinding awarded equity in-
centives until after they retire from their firms. 
Several dozen firms, including Exxon Mobil, Citigroup, and Deere, 
have adopted hold-till-retirement plans that require executives to hold 
stock until they step down.30  As soon as the executives retire, they are 
free to unload the stock.  For example, Citigroup requires that directors 
and the Executive Committee of its senior management hold seventy-
five percent of the net shares granted to them under the firm’s equity 
programs until they leave those positions.  This holding requirement 
resets at age sixty-five if the covered person has not yet retired.31 
 The appeal of retirement-based cash-out dates is understandable.  
Such an approach would reduce the costs of replenishing executives’ 
equity holdings.  It would also cause executives to focus more on the 
long term—the anticipated value of their equity as of retirement—and 
less on the short term. 
Unfortunately, permitting executives to sell their shares upon re-
tirement may also create perverse incentives.  In particular, a hold-till-
retirement requirement may cause an executive to elect to retire even 
though the firm could still benefit from her services.  Suppose, for ex-
ample, that an executive with large amounts of unliquidated equity has 
information suggesting that the firm’s stock is overvalued and that, for 
reasons unrelated to the executive’s future performance, the stock 
price is likely to decline over the next several years.  Resigning at once 
would enable the executive to unload the accumulated equity earlier, 
and the prospect of large profits from such an unwinding may induce 
the executive to leave.  If the executive is the best person to run the 
firm, her departure could impose a substantial cost on the firm and its 
shareholders.  Retirement-based cash-out dates may, therefore, under-
mine the important retention purpose of equity arrangements.  Rather 
30 See Exxon Mobil Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 25 (Apr. 
13, 2009) (“50 percent of each grant is restricted for five years; and, [t]he balance is 
restricted for 10 years or until retirement, whichever is later.” (emphasis omitted)); 
Citigroup Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 29 (Mar. 20, 2009) (“As 
part of our commitment to aligning employee and stockholder interests, members of 
the management executive committee and members of the board of directors have 
agreed to hold 75% of the shares of common stock they acquire through Citigroup’s 
equity programs as long as they remain subject to the stock ownership commitment.”); 
Deere & Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 61 ( Jan. 13, 2010) (“RSUs 
granted in fiscal 2009 and 2008 must be held until retirement or other permitted ter-
mination of employment . . . .”). 
31 Citigroup Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 30, at 29.  
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than provide retention benefits, equity-based compensation with a hold-
till-retirement requirement might push the executive out. 
Even more perversely, retirement-based blocking provisions could 
lead the most successful executives to retire.  The executives with the 
strongest temptation to quit will be those with the largest amounts of 
unliquidated equity.  The value of such equity will generally be higher 
when the executive has generated considerable returns for sharehold-
ers over a long period of time.  Tying equity unwinding to retirement 
may therefore provide an especially strong incentive for long-serving 
and successful executives to leave their firms.32 
In addition, if the executive is permitted to cash out all of her 
blocked equity immediately upon retirement, the arrangement will 
encourage her to place excessive weight on short-term results in her 
last year or two of service.  Consider an executive who plans to leave 
within the next two years, either because of the retirement-based cash-
out provision or for some other reason.  Knowing that she will be able 
to cash out all of her equity in one or two years, the executive will have 
an incentive to pay too much attention to the stock price around the 
time of her retirement. 
Some who urge companies to adopt retirement-based holding 
plans have suggested that executives be required to hold their shares 
for one or two years following retirement.33  Such a postretirement 
holding requirement would reduce, but not eliminate, the costs of 
hold-till-retirement plans discussed above.  Under such an arrange-
ment, retirement would not enable immediate unwinding.  However, 
it could still substantially accelerate executives’ ability to unwind some 
of their vested equity incentives.  As a result, retirement-based plans 
with a postretirement holding requirement of one or two years could 
still produce perverse incentives to retire prematurely.  Furthermore, 
while requiring an executive to hold equity incentives for one or two 
32 More generally, one must be careful of arrangements that enable an executive 
to cash out her equity on the occurrence of some event X, where X is at least partly un-
der the control of the executive and may not always be desirable.  For example, the 
federal government limits the ability of executives of TARP firms to cash out their re-
stricted stock until the government is repaid in full.  See TARP Standards for Compen-
sation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,394, 28,410 ( June 15, 2009) (re-
stricting transferability until, among other conditions, “[t]he remainder of the shares 
or units granted at the time of repayment of 100% of the aggregate financial assistance 
received”).  Although this restriction is understandable—it reduces executives’ ability 
to reap large stock profits before taxpayers recover their investment—it may give the 
executives a strong personal incentive to repay the government even if this would leave 
their firms with insufficient capital.  
33  See, e.g., Press Release, AFSCME, supra note 29.  
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years after retirement would prevent an executive about to retire from 
focusing exclusively on stock prices in the very short term, the execu-
tive’s horizon could still be limited to one or two years, with insuffi-
cient weight placed on stock values in the longer term. 
Given these two drawbacks of existing and proposed retirement-
based holding requirements—incentivizing early retirement and en-
couraging a focus on short-term performance immediately before re-
tirement—it is important to employ holding requirements that do not 
encourage executives to retire early or place a large weight on the 
short term as the executives approach retirement.  We will later dis-
cuss alternative limitations on unwinding that would not produce such 
perverse incentives.  Before proceeding, however, we can state the les-
son of this Section’s discussion: 
 
PRINCIPLE 2:  Executives’ ability to unwind their equity incentives should 
not be tied to retirement. 
C.  Grant-Based Limitations on Unwinding 
We begin by discussing grant-based limitations that should be 
placed on the unwinding of equity incentives.  By “grant-based limita-
tions,” we mean restrictions that are defined with respect to each equi-
ty grant awarded to an executive.  The grant-based limitation we favor, 
based on a proposal in Pay Without Performance, would allow an execu-
tive to unload increasing amounts of equity as time passes from the 
vesting date of a particular equity grant.34 
For example, after allowing for whatever cashing out of vested eq-
uity incentives is necessary to pay any vesting-related taxes, an execu-
tive might be required to hold all remaining equity incentives for two 
years after vesting.  On the two-year anniversary of vesting, the execu-
tive would be free to unwind twenty percent of the grant.  On each of 
the following anniversary dates, the executive would be free to unwind 
another twenty percent of the grant.  So the executive would be per-
mitted to sell the first twenty percent two years after vesting, forty per-
cent three years after vesting, and the entire amount six years after 
vesting.  We call this the “fixed-date” approach because stock becomes 
freely transferable on fixed dates, rather than upon retirement or 
some other date chosen or influenced by the executive. 
34 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 174-76 (describing the benefits of a re-
stricted-unwinding arrangement). 
2010] Paying for Long-Term Performance 1929 
This fixed-date approach would avoid both costs associated with us-
ing a retirement-based approach.  Because an executive’s ability to 
cash out a particular equity grant is based on fixed dates on the calen-
dar, her decision whether to remain at the firm or to retire would not 
be affected by the prospect of being able to unwind large amounts of 
equity.  Whether she remains at the firm or retires, the executive can 
cash out that particular grant of equity when—and only when—she 
reaches those fixed dates. 
In addition, under the fixed-date approach, executives would not 
have an incentive to focus on the short term as retirement ap-
proached.  Because each equity grant is made at a different point of 
time and must be unwound gradually, the executive does not face a 
situation in which she can cash out almost all of her unliquidated eq-
uity at once.  Thus, even when the executive is in her last year or two 
in office, she will still have an incentive to consider the effect of her 
decisions on long-term share value. 
Some firms have begun adopting variants of the fixed-date ap-
proach.  GE requires executives exercising options to hold any net 
shares that they receive for one year.35  Procter & Gamble requires the 
CEO to hold net shares received upon the exercise of options for two 
years.36  Honeywell has a one-year holding policy that applies after the 
vesting of any stock award, including options.37  Goldman Sachs re-
cently announced that it will pay 100% of discretionary compensation 
(the dominant portion of their executives’ pay) in “Shares at Risk” 
that cannot be sold for five years.38  Similarly, Special Master for TARP 
Executive Compensation Kenneth Feinberg has required firms under 
his jurisdiction to pay some of their executives in stock that cannot be 
unloaded for at least two years.39 
35 Gen. Elec. Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 19 (Mar. 3, 2008). 
36 Procter & Gamble Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 21 (Aug. 
28, 2009). 
37 Honeywell Int’l Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 19 (Mar. 11, 
2010). 
38 Press Release, Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs Announces Changes to 2009 
Compensation Program (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ 
our-firm/press/press-releases/archived/2009/compensation.html. 
39 See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth R. Feinberg, Office of the Special Master for TARP 
Executive Compensation, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, to Robert Benmosche, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, AIG, Inc. (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/ 
press/releases/docs/20091022%20AIG%20Letter.pdf (requiring the majority of an indi-
vidual’s base salary to be paid in stock of AIG insurance subsidiaries that must be held for 
two years). 
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One limitation of some of the arrangements noted in the preced-
ing paragraph is that the required holding periods after vesting tend 
to be short.  Another limitation is that, unlike our approach that pro-
vides for gradual unwinding, they make stock disposable all at once.  
This could lead to situations in which executives who anticipate the 
ability to sell a large amount of equity incentives become too focused 
on short-term stock prices. 
One firm, Exxon Mobil, has put in place a hybrid approach that 
uses both fixed dates and retirement in its holding requirements.  Un-
der Exxon Mobil’s plan, an executive must hold fifty percent of her 
stock grant until the later of ten years from grant or retirement.40  Thus, 
if retirement occurs early, the executive can cash out the stock only af-
ter ten years have passed since the grant date.  However, if the executive 
continues to work at the firm for more than ten years from the grant 
date, she is permitted to cash out the equity only upon retirement. 
Because Exxon Mobil’s arrangement functions like a fixed-date 
plan under some circumstances, it will create better incentives than a 
pure retirement-based plan would in such cases.  Consider Executive 
A, who received a grant five years ago and who is planning to retire 
well before the ten year anniversary of the grant.  The plan structure 
would not provide Executive A with any incentive to accelerate her re-
tirement, as acceleration would not enable her to cash out the equity 
from the grant any earlier. 
Under some circumstances, however, Exxon Mobil’s plan func-
tions like a retirement-based plan, and, in such cases, it will create un-
desirable incentives.  Consider the situation in which ten years have 
passed since the equity grant to Executive B.  Executive B is consider-
ing whether to retire.  Exxon Mobil’s plan, which will allow her to 
cash out the entire equity grant upon retirement, may induce her to 
retire too early.  In addition, whenever Executive B decides to retire, 
the ability to cash out all of the equity from the grant at that time will 
induce her to pay undue attention to short-term stock prices in the 
period leading up to her retirement. 
What of the concern that fixed-date limitations on unwinding 
would require an executive to hold stock after retirement and thereby 
subject that executive to undue risk?  For example, consider a CEO 
receiving equity with a cash-out date in five years who is planning to 
retire in one year.  Her final payoff will, in part, be a function of her 
successor’s decisions in years two through five.  The compensation 
40 Exxon Mobil Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 30, at 25. 
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provided to such a CEO, it might be argued, should not depend on 
how her successor performs. 
However, the fact that the payoffs of the CEO under the fixed-
date limitation could depend (for better or worse) on her successor’s 
performance should not be too troubling.  Much of a firm’s stock-
price movement is commonly driven by market and industry factors, 
rather than by firm-specific factors.  Furthermore, the part of the 
stock performance that is due to firm-specific effects is substantially 
influenced by factors other than the CEO’s own performance, such as 
the contributions of other current employees and former employees, 
including the former CEO.  Thus, any equity-based pay arrangement 
subjects the CEO’s payoff to a considerable amount of “noise” from 
factors other than her own performance.  Fixed-date limitations on 
unwinding would be no different. 
The key question is whether an executive’s incentives are im-
proved by requiring her to hold an equity grant for a fixed period of 
time, even if that fixed period may extend into her retirement.  The 
answer to this question is yes.  Requiring the retiring executive to hold 
her shares until the specified fixed date would both (1) remove any 
incentive for the CEO to accelerate her retirement and (2) make it 
less likely that she will focus on short-term results while making deci-
sions for the firm just prior to retirement.  We can thus conclude by 
stating the following principle: 
 
PRINCIPLE 3:  After allowing for any cashing out necessary to pay any tax-
es arising from vesting, equity-based awards should be subject to grant-based 
limitations on unwinding that allow them to be unwound only gradually, be-
ginning some time after vesting. 
D.  Aggregate Limitations on Unwinding 
The grant-based limitations we have proposed, while beneficial, 
do not fully address the concern that executives may place excessive 
weight on short-term prices.  Executives serving for an extended pe-
riod of time may receive a number of different equity-based grants.  At 
any given point, the incentives of such executives—and the weight 
they place on short-term stock prices—will be shaped by their overall 
portfolio of firm stock. The incentives will depend, in particular, on 
the total number of equity-based instruments they will have accumu-
lated and on the fraction of such instruments that they can freely un-
load in the near future. 
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Consider an executive hired in 2010 who receives, in 2010 and each 
following year, a grant of one million shares that (other than to cover 
any taxes upon vesting) she cannot cash out at a rate of more than 
twenty percent per year, beginning two years after the end of a two-year 
vesting period.  For the first two years after vesting, the executive will 
not be able to sell any shares (beyond those sold to pay any taxes), and 
the executive’s equity awards will provide no incentive to focus on short-
term prices.  During the third year of service after vesting, the executive 
will be free to sell twenty percent of the 2010 award but will be holding 
a much larger number of shares that she is not free to unload. 
Suppose that this executive will serve the company for many years.  
Fast forward to (say) her fifteenth year.  By this point, the executive 
may have accumulated a large number of firm shares through annual 
grants, a substantial fraction of which, under the grant-based restric-
tions, she is free to unload immediately if she so chooses.  In such a 
case, the ability to unload a large fraction of her portfolio quickly may 
lead the executive to pay excessive attention to short-term prices.  
Grant-based limitations are thus not sufficient to avoid “short-termism” 
and other problems associated with executives’ ability to unwind large 
amounts of stock at once when executives serve a significant period of 
time and accumulate large numbers of disposable shares. 
This was the case, for example, with the top five executives at Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers during the years preceding the firms’ 
meltdowns.  Most members of the firms’ top management teams were 
long-serving executives who had accumulated large portfolios of shares 
and options.  As a result, even though the firms had substantial grant-
based limitations on unloading, the executives were free during this 
period to sell large numbers of shares relative to their total holdings.  
Indeed, a recent case study, which one of us coauthored with Alma 
Cohen and Holger Spamann, estimates that between 2000 and 2008 
the top five executive teams at Bear and Lehman cashed out nearly 
$2 billion of their equity:  about $1.1 billion at Bear and $850 million 
at Lehman.  The sales during this period enabled the executives to 
unwind more shares than they held when the firms failed in 2008.41 
41 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure:  
Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. (forth-
coming Summer 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513522 (reporting that 
Bear and Lehman executives cashed out large amounts of bonus compensation and 
pocketed large amounts from selling shares in the period leading up to the financial 
crisis of 2008–2009).  
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To address such situations, we believe that it is important to sup-
plement firms’ grant-based limitations on unwinding with aggregate 
limitations on unwinding tied to the entire portfolio of vested equity 
that the executive has accumulated over time through her compensa-
tion arrangements.  We propose that, in any given year, executives 
should not be permitted to unload more than a specified percentage 
of the total vested equity they hold at the beginning of the year.  By de-
finition and by construction, such an approach will limit the weight the 
executive accords to short-term results and stock prices. 
For example, a firm could prohibit executives from selling, in each 
year, more than ten percent of the vested equity they hold at the begin-
ning of the year.  An executive subject to such an arrangement would 
have little incentive to increase the stock price in the coming year at the 
expense of the stock price in the more distant future.  Even if the ex-
ecutive unwinds the ten percent of the shares she is free to unwind dur-
ing this year, taking such steps would reduce the value of the ninety 
percent of the vested equity she cannot sell. 
Importantly, these proposed aggregate limitations on unwinding 
should not end immediately upon retirement.  If they did, executives 
might be able to unload a large amount of stock as soon as they step 
down.  Consider, for example, a long-serving executive who has been 
able to accumulate a substantial amount of equity incentives.  If the 
proposed aggregate limitation on unwinding terminates upon retire-
ment, that executive would be free to unwind a considerable amount 
of stock the day after she retires.  As we explained earlier, an ability to 
unload large amounts of stock upon retirement could have two unde-
sirable consequences.  First, it may induce an executive to retire earli-
er than is desirable.  Second, it may lead the executive to focus too 
much on the short term as she approaches retirement.  Therefore, 
terminating aggregate limitations on unwinding upon retirement 
could impose large costs. 
Although the aggregate limitations on unwinding should not be 
suspended immediately upon retirement, they need not continue inde-
finitely after the executive retires.  An aggregate unwinding limitation 
could instead expire several years after retirement.  If executives knew 
they could not unwind most of their shares for (say) five years after re-
tirement, their incentives to focus on the long term would not be un-
dermined as they approached retirement.  In addition, because retire-
ment would not alter for several years the fraction of shares that could 
be sold, the additional incentive to retire would be limited. 
1934 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1915 
The principle that we thus recommend is as follows: 
 
PRINCIPLE 4:  All equity-based awards should be subject to aggregate limi-
tations on unwinding so that, in each year (including a specified number of 
years after retirement), an executive may unwind no more than a specified per-
centage of her equity incentives that is not subject to grant-based limitations on 
unwinding at the beginning of the year. 
 
Currently, many firms have “target ownership plans” that either 
encourage or require managers to hold a certain amount of shares—
usually expressed as a multiple of the executive’s salary.42  But the tar-
gets have tended to be low.  In an examination of 195 firms that 
adopted such plans, John Core and David Larcker found that only 138 
disclosed the ownership target for CEOs.43  Among these 138, the min-
imum level of ownership for the median CEO was four times her base 
salary.44  However, other elements of the compensation package, such 
as equity compensation and bonuses, commonly dwarf an executive’s 
base salary.  As a result, the target ownership amount may be less than 
one year’s compensation.  Furthermore, fewer than thirty percent of 
the firms imposed a penalty for not meeting the target.45  In many cas-
es, the targets were purely voluntary. 
Firms continue to use multiples of base salary in creating holding 
requirements, and these multiples are often low relative to the total 
compensation executives receive over time.  For example, Procter & 
Gamble required former CEO A.G. Lafley to hold shares or restricted 
stock units valued at eight times his base salary.46  This requirement 
may appear stringent at first glance, but Lafley would need to hold on-
ly $14 million worth of stock—less than twenty percent of his $75 mil-
lion aggregate compensation between 2006 and 2008.47  Verizon re-
quires CEO Ivan Seidenberg to hold shares valued at five times his base 
salary of $2.1 million.48  This $10 million holding requirement, howev-
42 John E. Core & David F. Larcker, Performance Consequences of Mandatory Increases 
in Executive Stock Ownership, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 317, 326 (2002). 
43 See id. at 324 (compiling executive stockholding requirements). 
44 Id. 
45 See id. at 320 (“52 (27%) of our sample firms state an explicit penalty for execu-
tives who do not meet the ownership target.”). 
46 Procter & Gamble Co., Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 36, at 21. 
47 See id. at 37 (reporting Lafley’s compensation of $23,605,453 for 2008–2009, 
$23,532,410 for 2007–2008, and $27,735,734 for 2006–2007). 
48 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 39-40 
(Mar. 23, 2009). 
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er, is less than fifteen percent of the $66 million in compensation Sei-
denberg received between 2006 and 2008.49  CVS Caremark also re-
quires its CEO, Thomas Ryan, to hold five times his base salary in 
stock.50  Ryan’s base salary is $1.4 million, producing a share ownership 
target of $7 million.  That share ownership target, however, is less than 
ten percent of the $74 million Ryan made between 2006 and 2008.51 
However, some firms do appear to have more demanding re-
quirements.  A number of investment banks now require executives to 
hold over half of their equity awards after certain deductions.  Citi-
group, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley all re-
quire certain top executives to hold at least seventy-five percent of the 
shares they receive from their firms, less an allowance for the payment 
of the option exercise price and taxes.52  This requirement is likely to 
be more meaningful than standard target-ownership requirements 
because it is related to total equity compensation over time rather 
than to base salary. 
In contrast to these firms’ policies, which allow executives to sell a 
specified fraction of their total equity compensation and then leave ex-
ecutives with discretion as to when to make the permitted sales, our ap-
proach specifies the fraction of vested equity that executives may sell 
during any given year.  The advantage of this approach is that it ensures 
that currently serving executives never unload a large block of their eq-
uity at any given time.  Interestingly, at least one savvy investor found 
inadequate Goldman Sachs’s equity holding requirements, which per-
mit executives to sell twenty-five percent of their total accumulated eq-
uity compensation.  When Warren Buffett invested in Goldman Sachs, 
he required its CEO and other high-ranking executives to commit to 
hold ninety percent of their stock for three years or until Buffett termi-
nated his investment in Goldman Sachs (whichever comes first).53 
49 See id. at 40 (reporting Seidenberg’s compensation of $18,573,638 for 2008, 
$26,553,576 for 2007, and $21,260,754 for 2006). 
50 CVS Caremark Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 29, 33 
(Mar. 24, 2009). 
51 See id. at 33 (reporting Ryan’s compensation of $24,102,648 in 2008, 
$26,097,790 in 2007, and  $24,020,009 in 2006). 
52 Citigroup Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 30, at 16; Goldman Sachs 
Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 16 (Apr. 6, 2009); JPMor-
gan Chase & Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 19 (Mar. 31, 2009); 
Morgan Stanley, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 11 (Mar. 31, 2009). 
53 See Christine Harper, Goldman Executives Restrained from Stock Sales in Buffett Deal, 
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=a1I3DK.6XgxY (“Goldman Sachs Group Inc.’s top four executives 
agreed to hold on to 90 percent of the stock they own in the company as part of Gold-
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Before concluding this Part, it is worth relating the limitations on 
unwinding proposed in this Part to the analysis that follows in Parts II 
and III.  First, while the above limitations would determine how many 
equity instruments an executive can unload in a given year, the execu-
tive should not be free to choose the timing of those sales within the 
year.  Rather, it would be desirable to impose restrictions on how such 
shares are sold, a topic we take up in Part II.  Second, the proposed 
limitations on unwinding can be relied on to produce their intended 
benefits only if executives cannot circumvent them using hedging or 
derivative transactions.  We will discuss necessary limitations on such 
transactions in Part III. 
II.  PREVENTING GAMING 
Executive compensation arrangements should be structured to 
minimize the likelihood that executives will engage in various types of 
“gaming”—springloading, selling on private information, and mani-
pulating the stock price—both prior to receiving equity grants and be-
fore unwinding that equity.  We explain below what steps firms should 
take to reduce such gaming both at the “front end”—when equity is 
granted—and at the “back end”—when it is cashed out. 
A.  The Front End 
Much attention has been focused on the problem of firms back-
dating option grants to executives and other employees.  Over one 
man’s agreement to raise money from Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc.”).  
Goldman Sachs’s definitive proxy statement described the agreement as follows:   
Messrs. Blankfein, Cohn, Winkelried and Viniair each have agreed that, with 
certain exceptions, until the earlier of October 1, 2011 and the date of re-
demption of all of our 10% Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series G 
(Series G Preferred Stock), whether or not he continues to be employed by 
us, (i) he will continue to satisfy the share retention requirements described 
in the preceding paragraph and (ii) he, his spouse and any of their estate 
planning vehicles will not dispose of more than 10% of the aggregate number 
of shares of Common Stock that he, his spouse and any such estate planning 
vehicles beneficially owned on September 28, 2008. 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 52, at 16.  Buffett 
imposed a similar requirement when investing in General Electric.  See Rachel Layne, 
GE’s Immelt Waived Bonus Pay After 2008 Profit Drop, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSAtrN029FQY (“Immelt, 
who has always exceeded a requirement to hold shares valued at six times his salary in 
stock, agreed in October to hold at least 90 percent of the shares he already owns as a 
condition of Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s investment in the company.”). 
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thousand companies appear to have illegally backdated the grants of 
managers’ options.54  Such backdating both increased and obscured 
the value of executives’ equity-based compensation.  Most of this 
backdating took place before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,55 which 
changed reporting requirements to make backdating more difficult.  
However, option-grant backdating continued even after Sarbanes-
Oxley, in open violation of that statute’s reporting provisions.56  For-
tunately, heightened media and regulatory scrutiny will likely reduce 
the amount of option-grant backdating going forward and may well 
put an end to this practice. 
However, even if option-grant backdating is eliminated, firms 
must address two other problematic practices surrounding equity 
grants.  In particular, firms must ensure that executives do not use in-
side information to game the timing of equity grants to shift value 
from public shareholders to themselves (so-called “springloading”).  
Firms must also reduce executives’ ability to affect the stock price 
around grants through their control over the flow of information 
from the firm. 
1.  The Timing of Equity Grants 
Executives can make themselves better off by using inside infor-
mation to time their option and restricted stock grants.  In particular, 
equity grants can be awarded when executives know that good news 
will emerge in the near future.  This practice of informed grant timing 
is called “springloading.” 
Executives have particularly strong incentives to springload option 
grants.  Public company executives frequently receive large, multiyear 
option grants—sometimes totaling tens or hundreds of millions of 
54 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, J. FIN. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 6-9, on file with author) (finding that before Sarbanes-Oxley, fifty-five 
percent of “lucky grant events” were due to opportunistic timing); Jesse M. Fried, Op-
tion Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 863-64 (2008) (noting 
studies that suggest that over 2000 firms backdated executive stock option grants be-
tween 1996 and 2005).  Executives were further enriched by the backdating of stock 
option exercises, as well as by the backdating of stock option grants to nonexecutive 
employees.  See id. at 871-80 (explaining how these practices can boost executives’ pay 
in a way hidden from shareholders). 
55 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
56 See Fried, supra note 54, at 882-83 (explaining that “thousands of firms contin-
ued to engage in secret option backdating” even after Sarbanes-Oxley and the accom-
panying stock exchange reforms). 
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dollars—on a specific grant date.57  Most of these option grants are is-
sued “at-the-money”:  the strike price is set to the market price on the 
grant date.  The value of the option grant critically depends on the 
strike price; a lower strike price increases the value of the option.  
Thus, an executive who knows that good news will emerge shortly, 
boosting the stock price, can benefit by accelerating an option grant 
so that the strike price is set to the (low) current price. 
To illustrate how springloading benefits executives, suppose ABC 
Corporation’s stock is trading at $90 on Monday.  The board is plan-
ning to issue at-the-money options on Friday.  However, the board 
knows that good news will emerge by Friday, boosting the stock price 
to $100 on that date.  Instead of waiting until Friday to issue an at-the-
money option with a strike price of $100, the board issues an at-the-
money option on Monday with a strike price of $90.  By Friday, when 
the board was originally planning to issue the option, the stock price 
is $100, and the Monday-issued option is already $10 “in-the-money”:  
the strike price is $10 below the market price.  Essentially, springload-
ing is economically equivalent to giving an executive an in-the-money 
option disguised as an at-the-money option.58 
A widely reported instance of springloading occurred at the medi-
cal-device firm Cyberonics in 2004.  The board approved stock option 
grants for top executives one evening, several hours after the company 
had received positive news about the regulatory prospects for one of 
its products.  The next day, Cyberonics’ stock price took off; so did the 
value of the options.  The company’s chair and CEO “earned” instant 
paper profits of $2.3 million.59 
Cyberonics was not an isolated incident.  Rather, according to a re-
cent empirical study by Rik Sen, widespread springloading continued 
even after Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted.60  Sen’s study examined option 
57 For example, in 2001 Apple gave Steve Jobs a single option grant with a Black-
Scholes value of around $500 million.  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 161. 
58 In that respect, springloading is similar to grant backdating, which also disguises 
in-the-money options as at-the-money options.  See Fried, supra note 54, at 859-61. 
59 Barnaby J. Feder, Questions Raised on Another Chief’s Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 9, 2006, at C1. 
60 See Rik Sen, The Returns to Spring-Loading 2, 10-14 (Mar. 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102639 (finding widespread spring- 
loading in a sample of public firms between 2002 and 2006); see also Daniel W. Collins et 
al., The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Timing Manipulation of CEO Stock 
Option Awards 11-17 (Nov. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=850564 (examining option grants in public firms between 
1999 and 2003, reporting that there are positive abnormal returns in the forty-day pe-
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grants by public companies between September 2002 and March 2006, 
focusing on “unscheduled” option grants—those that did not appear to 
be made according to the normal grant schedule and were thus most 
likely to be springloaded.61  Sen found that, following such grants, the 
stock experienced 1.1% monthly abnormal (i.e., market-adjusted) re-
turns, providing strong evidence that, in many cases, the stock was un-
derpriced relative to its actual value on the grant date.62 
Boards seeking to favor executives may also have an incentive to 
springload restricted stock grants.  For example, if the value of the 
grant is fixed, springloading will allow the firm to give the executives 
more shares, boosting their overall compensation.  Suppose again that 
ABC Corporation’s stock is trading at $90 per share on Monday, but the 
board knows that good news will emerge on Friday, boosting the stock 
price to $100 per share.  Suppose also that ABC’s CEO is entitled to re-
ceive $9 million worth of stock this year, valued at the current trading 
price.  If the board grants the CEO the stock on Friday, she will receive 
90,000 shares ($9 million divided by $100 per share).  If the board 
grants the CEO the stock on Monday, she will receive 100,000 shares 
($9 million divided by $90 per share). Springloading the restricted 
stock grant in this example thus gives the CEO an additional 10,000 
shares worth $100 each, or an extra $1 million.63 
Executives’ ability to benefit from springloading options and re-
stricted stock can be substantially reduced by granting both types of eq-
uity on fixed dates throughout the firm’s calendar.  Such dates might 
include (1) the first regularly scheduled compensation-committee 
meeting following an executive’s initial hire; (2) the meeting of the 
compensation committee accompanying the company’s annual meet-
ing of shareholders; or (3) the regularly scheduled meeting of the 
compensation committee for the first quarter.  A number of companies 
have already adopted this approach.  For example, Juniper Networks 
and other companies accused of backdating stock options have, as part 
of their settlements of backdating-related claims, agreed to restrict the 
riod following unscheduled option grants after Sarbanes-Oxley, and concluding that 
this likely reflects the award of options before good news). 
61 Sen, supra note 60, at 12-13. 
62 Id. at 21. 
63 If the number of shares granted is fixed, springloading the stock grant may still 
benefit an executive in two ways.  First, by enabling the firm to report less compensa-
tion for the executive, springloading is likely to reduce shareholder outrage over the 
amount of the executive’s pay.  Second, to the extent springloading lowers reported 
compensation expense and boosts reported earnings, it may enable the executive to 
receive larger earnings-based cash bonuses.   
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dates on which the firm can grant options and restricted stock to execu-
tives.64  Other companies would benefit from following their example. 
This brings us to the following principle: 
 
PRINCIPLE 5:  The timing of equity awards to executives should not be dis-
cretionary.  Rather, such grants should be made only on prespecified dates. 
2.  Stock-Price Manipulation Around Equity Grants 
Even if equity grant dates are fixed in advance, executives may be 
able to game equity awards at the front end by influencing corporate 
disclosures prior to the equity award.  For example, executives may 
have an interest in accelerating the release of negative information 
before the equity award and delaying disclosures about positive devel-
opments until after the award.  Artificially lowering the stock price in 
this manner can benefit executives, whether their grant consists of op-
tions or restricted stock. 
Executives have the strongest incentive to manipulate the stock 
price around option grants.  A lower grant-date price reduces the ex-
ercise price of at-the-money options, boosting managers’ profits when 
the options are later exercised.  Thus, even if managers cannot con-
trol the timing of option grants, they can profit by depressing the 
grant-date price, thereby getting options with exercise prices that are, 
on average, below the “true” value of the stock at the grant date.65  
Like the springloading described above, such manipulation disguises 
in-the-money options as at-the-money options. 
A number of studies find a systematic connection between option 
grants and corporate disclosures.  Specifically, companies are more 
likely to release bad news, and less likely to release good news, just be-
fore options are granted.66  One study examines companies that have 
64 See, e.g., Juniper Networks, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 
46 (Apr. 10, 2009) (“Annual equity awards to Section 16 officers are generally sche-
duled to be approved at a meeting of the Compensation Committee in the first quarter 
after the Q4 earnings announcement and prior to March 1.  The annual grants to Sec-
tion 16 officers are also generally scheduled to be effective on the third Friday of the 
month if the meeting approving such grants occurs on or before such date.”). 
65 See, e.g., Terry Baker et al., Incentives and Opportunities to Manage Earnings Around 
Option Grants, CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 22-23), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1124088 (reporting that managers can use discretionary fi-
nancial accounting measures to lower option grant-date stock prices and thereby reduce 
option exercise prices).  
66 David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corpo-
rate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 73, 93 (2000) (“[F]irms whose CEOs re-
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scheduled option grant dates—that is, companies whose managers do 
not appear to control the timing of their option grants.67  It finds that 
managers time voluntary disclosures both to reduce the stock price 
before getting their at-the-money options and to boost the stock price 
afterward.68  Another study suggests that executives deliberately miss 
earnings targets to cause the stock price to drop before large option 
grants.  In particular, managers boost income-decreasing accruals prior 
to stock option grants.69 
An executive about to receive a restricted stock grant may also 
have an incentive to lower the stock price on the grant date.  For ex-
ample, if the value of the grant is fixed and the number of shares is 
variable, depressing the grant-date stock price enables the executive to 
receive more shares, boosting her compensation directly.  If the ex-
ecutive can reduce the stock price by (say) ten percent, she will get 
approximately ten percent more shares in the option grant. 
Firms could eliminate the incentive to manipulate the stock price 
around the grant of stock options or restricted stock by setting the ex-
ercise price to a price other than the grant-date stock price.  For ex-
ample, consider an executive who is promised that, over each of X 
years, Y options will be granted each year.  Instead of setting the exer-
cise price to the stock price on the grant date each year—a price that 
could be manipulated—the exercise price could be set to the stock 
price at the time of hiring. 
Similarly, the incentive to manipulate the stock price around the 
grant date of restricted stock would be reduced if the promised grants 
of restricted stock each year were specified in terms of the number of 
shares, rather than their value at the time of the grant.  Otherwise, the 
executive may have an incentive to depress the stock price around the 
grant date to boost the number of shares received.70  This brings us to 
yet another principle: 
ceive options shortly before earnings announcements are more likely to issue bad news 
forecasts, and less likely to issue good news forecasts, than are firms whose CEOs re-
ceive their awards only after earnings announcements.”). 
67 Id. at 82. 
68 Id. at 74-75. 
69 See Mary Lea McAnally et al., Executive Stock Options, Missed Earnings Targets 
and Earnings Management 3-6 (May 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=925584 (“[M]anagers with larger subsequent grants are 
more likely to miss annual earnings targets even after controlling for conflicting incen-
tives and other factors that potentially influence the decision to avoid missing an earn-
ings target.”). 
70 The executive may still have an incentive to manipulate the grant-date stock 
price around fixed-number restricted stock grants.  Depressing the stock price could 
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PRINCIPLE 6:  To reduce the potential for gaming, the terms and amount 
of posthiring equity awards should not be based on the grant-date stock price. 
B.  The Back End 
Our analysis in Part I emphasized the importance of requiring ex-
ecutives to hold stock for the long term.  We explained why it was de-
sirable to impose both grant-based and aggregate limitations on un-
winding.  These restrictions would limit the amount of equity that ex-
ecutives could unload each year.  We now focus more closely on the 
exact manner by which executives should be permitted to cash out the 
equity they are free to unwind in a given year. 
1.  Gaming Problems at the Back End 
Currently, executives have considerable discretion over when they 
sell their shares, including stock received through the exercise of op-
tions.  As we explain below, giving executives such freedom over the 
precise timing of unwinding after unblocking could give rise to two 
types of problems if the unblocking occurs while the executives are  
still in office:  they may use inside information to time equity sales and 
manipulate the stock price prior to such sales. 
a.  Using Inside Information to Time Equity Unwinding 
Executives who are free to decide when to sell their shares may 
use inside information to time their sales, selling before bad news 
emerges and the stock price declines.  For example, executives tend to 
exercise their options and sell the underlying stock before earnings 
deteriorate and the price of the stock underperforms the market.71  
These findings help to explain the body of evidence indicating that 
provide two benefits to the executive.  First, it would allow the firm to report less com-
pensation for the executive, reducing the risk of shareholder outrage.  Second, it 
would lower the firm’s compensation expense, boosting reported earnings and those 
elements of the executive’s pay package tied to earnings.  Thus, even if the firm uses 
fixed-number restricted stock grants, the executive can benefit from a lower grant-date 
stock price.  But we believe those benefits are smaller and less direct than the benefits 
from lowering the grant-date stock price around fixed-value restricted stock grants. 
71 See Jennifer N. Carpenter & Barbara Remmers, Executive Stock Option Exercises and 
Inside Information, 74 J. BUS. 513, 531-32 (2001) (finding empirical evidence that top 
managers at small firms may time the exercise of their options based on inside infor-
mation); Bin Ke et al., What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and How They Use It:  
Evidence from Insider Trades, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 342-43 (2003) (finding evidence 
that insiders time their trades well in advance of negative news to avoid the appearance 
of trading on inside information). 
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managers make considerable “abnormal” profits—that is, above-
market returns—when trading in their own firms’ stock.72 
The previous decade has provided many dramatic examples of in-
siders unloading shares before their firms’ stock prices plunged.  A 
study published by Fortune in September 2002 examined executive 
trading in the shares of publicly held firms that had reached a market 
capitalization of at least $400 million and whose shares subsequently 
had fallen at least seventy-five percent.73  The firms were ranked by the 
amount of executive sales.  At the top twenty-five firms, 466 executives 
collectively sold $23 billion before their stock plummeted.74 
b.  Stock-Price Manipulation Around Unwinding 
Whether or not inside information motivates executives’ stock 
sales, executives have an incentive to manipulate information to boost 
the stock price before selling.  In fact, many studies have found a con-
nection between the amount of executive selling and earnings manipu-
lation—both legal and illegal.  For example, firms in which annual op-
tion exercises are particularly high tend to have higher discretionary 
accruals (and, therefore, higher reported earnings) in those years and 
lower discretionary accruals and earnings in the subsequent two years.75  
Additionally, firms that fraudulently misstate their earnings tend to 
have more insider selling activity—measured by the number of transac-
tions, the number of shares sold, or the dollar amount of shares sold.76 
72 See Fried, supra note 22, at 322-23 (explaining that corporate insiders consistent-
ly earn excess returns when trading in their own shares). 
73 Mark Gimein, You Bought.  They Sold., FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 64, 65. 
74 Id. at 66. 
75 See Eli Bartov & Partha Mohanram, Private Information, Earnings Manipulations, 
and Executive Stock-Option Exercises, 79 ACCT. REV. 889, 909 (2004) (finding improved 
earnings performance before executives exercise options and deteriorating earnings 
performance after option exercises, which suggests that top-level management times 
option exercises based on inside information about future earnings).  
76 See Scott L. Summers & John T. Sweeney, Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements 
and Insider Trading:  An Empirical Analysis, 73 ACCT. REV. 131, 144 (1998) (“[I]nsiders in 
companies where fraud is found reduce their net position in the entity’s stock by engag-
ing in significant selling activity, regardless of whether selling activity is measured by dol-
lars of shares sold, number of shares sold or number of selling transactions.”); see also 
Messod D. Beneish, Incentives and Penalties Related to Earnings Overstatements that Violate 
GAAP, 74 ACCT. REV. 425, 454 (1999) (finding that managers of firms whose earnings 
were overstated tended to sell at a high rate before the overstatements were corrected); 
Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on Misreporting, 
79 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 63 (2006) (finding that top managers of firms that experienced ac-
counting irregularities and were subsequently subject to SEC enforcement actions had 
exercised their options in the preceding period at a higher rate than top managers of 
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The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was moti-
vated in part by the evidence of widespread earnings manipulation in 
the 1990s, has reduced—but not eliminated—executives’ ability to mi-
sreport earnings.  For example, in 2006, four years into the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley era, the number of earnings restatements filed by pub-
lic companies reached an all-time record:  1876.77  Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley 
does not appear to have prevented managers from misreporting.78 
Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley fails to reach one of the most harmful 
forms of earnings manipulation:  “real-earnings management,” the 
practice of making business decisions for the purpose of boosting 
short-term accounting results, rather than maximizing the size of the 
corporate pie.  For example, executives can prop up short-term earn-
ings by postponing desirable investments or by accelerating revenue-
generating transactions that would create more long-term value if they 
were delayed. 
Because real-earnings management does not violate the accounting 
rules as long as a firm’s financial statements properly reflect all of the 
relevant transactions, Sarbanes-Oxley cannot prevent or deter it.  In-
deed, such manipulation appears to have increased after Sarbanes-
Oxley.79  Thus, we can expect executives who sell large blocks of stock to 
continue manipulating the stock price around these sales—through 
both misreporting and real-earnings management—to increase their 
trading profits. 
other firms); Shane A. Johnson et al., Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud:  The 
Sources of the Incentives Matter 27 (Feb. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=395960 (“[F]raud executives generate greater payoffs than 
control executives during the fraud periods by selling stock and exercising options, with 
the overwhelming majority of the payoffs coming from stock sales.”). 
77 See David Reilly, Restatements Still Bedevil Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at C7. 
78 Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the CEO and CFO of a 
firm forced to restate earnings to return to the firm any bonus or other incentive or 
equity-based compensation received (or profits from stock sold) within twelve months 
of the misleading financial statement.  15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).  Thus, some may have 
hoped that Sarbanes-Oxley would reduce not only executives’ ability to manipulate 
earnings but also their incentive to do so.  However, this “clawback” provision applies 
only in special circumstances involving “misconduct,” and it has been invoked mainly 
in cases where executives were convicted of criminal fraud.  See Jerry W. Markham, Re-
gulating Excessive Executive Compensation—Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 299 
(2007) (“Unless convicted criminally, executives . . . usually were able to keep their 
bonuses.”).  Thus, section 304 is unlikely to deter misreporting in run-of-the-mill cases 
not involving criminal fraud. 
79 See Daniel A. Cohen et al., Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the 
Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods 33-34 (June 2007) (unpublished manuscript), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=813088 (finding that the level of real-earnings manage-
ment activities “increased significantly” after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley).   
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2.  Addressing Gaming Problems at the Back End 
Both forms of back-end gaming—executives’ use of inside infor-
mation to time their sales and price manipulation to boost their trad-
ing profits—hurt public investors.  Each extra dollar pocketed by 
managers comes at the expense of public shareholders.  More impor-
tantly, executives’ ability to sell on inside information and inflate the 
short-term stock price before unwinding can reduce the size of the to-
tal corporate pie by distorting managers’ operational decisions ex 
ante.  The indirect costs to public investors of such distortions could 
be far larger than the value directly captured by executives. 
Fortunately, firms can reduce both forms of back-end gaming.  In 
particular, firms should limit the extent to which the payoff from stock 
sales depends on a single stock price.  Rather, as we explain below, the 
payoff should be based on the average stock price over a significant pe-
riod of time.  In addition, executives should be required either to dis-
close their sales several months before they begin to unwind their equi-
ty or to unload their stock under an automatic schedule created when 
the equity is granted. 
a.  Average-Price Payoffs 
Currently, executives can choose the precise date on which and 
the price at which they will sell a large amount of stock.  This allows 
executives to use inside information to time the sale when the stock 
price is high and about to decline.  Moreover, whatever the motive for 
the sale, executives about to unload a large amount of stock have an 
incentive to manipulate the stock price to increase their profits from 
the sale.  We present two approaches to tying payoffs to the average 
stock price—“immediate cash-out” and “gradual cash-out”—and show 
that either approach would reduce both types of back-end gaming. 
Under the immediate cash-out approach, executives would be 
permitted to liquidate large amounts of “unblocked” equity by selling 
the equity to the firm at the current market price; a certain number of 
months later (X months), the transaction price would be retroactively 
adjusted to reflect the average price of the stock over those X months.  
To illustrate, suppose an executive of ABC Corporation decides to sell 
100,000 shares of ABC stock, then trading at $10 per share.  The ex-
ecutive would transfer the stock to ABC in exchange for an immediate 
payment of $1 million (100,000 shares at $10 per share).  The firm 
would track the average closing price over the next X months.  If the 
average closing price of the stock exceeded $10, the executive would 
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receive an additional payout at the end of X months.  Conversely, if 
the average monthly closing price fell short of $10, the executive 
would be required to return some of the $1 million to ABC at the end 
of X months. 
Alternatively, an executive wishing to unload unblocked equity 
could be permitted to sell the shares in the market only gradually, ac-
cording to a prespecified, automatic plan.  Consider again the execu-
tive of ABC Corporation.  If she decided to sell 100,000 shares of 
company stock, she would be permitted to sell 100,000/X shares on 
(say) the first trading day of each of the following X months.  Under 
this gradual cash-out approach, the executive would be required to 
execute all planned trades; she could not back out of them if she later 
obtained inside information suggesting that she would be better off 
not selling the stock. 
This gradual cash-out approach is similar to the widely used 10b5-1 
trading plans, but there is an important difference.  An executive can 
terminate a 10b5-1 plan midstream if she later obtains inside informa-
tion suggesting that she is better off keeping her stock—thereby enabl-
ing her to make higher trading profits at the expense of public share-
holders.80  Under our proposed approach, once executives announce 
sales, they must effect them according to the terms of the previously 
specified plan.  They may not terminate the sales midstream.81 
By tying executives’ equity payoff to the stock’s average price over 
a long period of time, both the immediate cash-out approach and the 
gradual cash-out approach would make it more difficult for executives 
to use inside information to time their stock sales.  An executive 
could, of course, initiate an unwinding based upon inside information 
indicating that the stock price is likely to drop.  But the payout from 
each unwinding would be a function of the average stock price over a 
80 See Jesse M. Fried, Essay, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455, 486-91 (2003) 
(“[W]hen an insider enters the SEC’s safe harbor by employing a prearranged plan, 
the ability to terminate the plan while aware of material nonpublic information per-
mits her to use material nonpublic information to increase her trading profits.”). 
81 The gradual cash-out approach is different from the immediate cash-out ap-
proach in two respects.  First, it is administratively simpler.  The executive unloads her 
stock directly into the market on specified dates; the prices on those dates determine 
the payoff.  Unlike the immediate cash-out approach, the firm need not effect the ini-
tial transaction and then, X months later, determine the amount to be transferred to 
or from the executive to ensure that her net payoff equals the average stock price over 
the X -month period.  Second, unlike the immediate cash-out approach, the executive 
must wait X months to fully liquidate the equity being unwound.  The administrative 
simplicity of the gradual cash-out approach thus comes at the expense of higher liquid-
ity costs for the executive. 
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period of X months.  To the extent that the inside information emerges 
and becomes incorporated into the stock price before the X -month 
period ends, the payoff from the unwinding would be lower than un-
der current practice, which enables an executive to dump all of her 
stock at a single price. 
Similarly, both the immediate and gradual cash-out approaches 
would reduce executives’ incentives to manipulate the short-term 
stock price prior to unwinding.  Such manipulation might affect the 
stock price at the beginning of the X -month period.  But if the speci-
fied period is sufficiently long, any temporary boost in the price would 
be at least partially reversed (and perhaps followed by an offsetting 
dip) later in the X -month period, thereby reducing the net payoff to 
the executive from manipulating the stock price (and perhaps elimi-
nating it altogether). 
b.  The Need for Additional Steps 
The immediate and gradual cash-out approaches described above 
would reduce executives’ ability to profit from inside information by 
tying payoffs to the average stock price over a specified period.  How-
ever, they would not eliminate executives’ ability to use inside infor-
mation to time their sales.  Executives often have inside information 
bearing on the performance of the stock price many months in ad-
vance.82  Thus, tying executives’ payoffs to the average stock price over 
a certain period (X months) may not affect their ability to sell on in-
side information if this period is relatively short.  Consider an execu-
tive of a firm using a five-month cash-out period to determine payoffs, 
who has inside information suggesting the stock price will fall in six 
months.  If this executive unwinds her stock under either an imme-
diate or gradual cash-out arrangement, she will receive more for the 
stock than it is actually worth. 
Even if the cash-out period is relatively long, the use of average 
prices during this period would merely reduce—but not eliminate—
executives’ ability to sell on inside information.  Consider again the 
executive who has inside information suggesting that the stock price 
will fall in six months.  Suppose now that the cash-out period is one 
year.  If the insider initiates an unwinding, the stock price during the 
82 See Fried, supra note 22, at 346 (“[I]nsiders often have access to important in-
formation months before it is announced . . . .”); Ke et al., supra note 71, at 317 (re-
porting that insiders trade on accounting information as long as two years prior to the 
disclosure). 
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first six months of the twelve-month period will be higher than its true 
value; in the second six months, the stock price will (let us suppose) 
reflect its true value.  The average stock price over the entire twelve-
month period will thus be higher than its true value, and the execu-
tive will be able to generate more proceeds from selling the stock if 
she begins unwinding now rather than later. 
Indeed, the above analysis may help explain why 10b5-1 plans 
have not been that effective at reducing insider trading profits.  One 
study of executive trading in more than 1200 firms during the five-
year period ending in December 2005 found that insiders regularly 
use 10b5-1 plans to sell on inside information.83  In fact, the study 
found that executives using 10b5-1 plans were more likely to sell on 
valuable inside information than executives not using such plans.84 
To further reduce executives’ ability to sell on inside information, 
firms should take one of the additional steps we describe below:  ei-
ther (1) require executives to disclose their intended sales far in ad-
vance or (2) use a “hands-off” arrangement under which the cash-out 
dates are specified when the equity is granted, leaving executives with 
no discretion over when their stock is sold. 
c.  Pretrading  Disclosure 
If executives have any discretion over when they cash out their 
equity, they should be required to disclose their intended unwinding 
in advance, a proposal one of us made more than ten years ago.85  
Such advance disclosure, coupled with average-price payoffs, would 
further reduce executives’ ability to profit from the back-end gaming 
of insider trading. 
To begin, advance disclosure would give any inside information 
on which the executive is trading more time to emerge and become 
incorporated into the stock price.  The average stock price during the 
payoff period would thus more accurately reflect the actual value of 
83 See Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI. 
224, 232-35 (2009) (showing that trades by executives participating in 10b5-1 plans are 
followed by abnormal stock price declines). 
84 See id. at 229-32. 
85 See Fried, supra note 22, at 349-53 (arguing for a “pretrading disclosure rule,” un-
der which the corporate insider could not submit an order to buy or sell shares in the 
company without first giving notice in advance).  For a more condensed version of the 
proposal, see Jesse M. Fried, Advance Disclosure of Managers’ Stock Trades:  A Proposal to Im-
prove Executive Compensation, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Nov. 2006, http://www.bepress.com/ 
ev/vol3/iss8/art7. 
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the stock, improving the link between pay and performance.  For ex-
ample, suppose that the average price used to determine the payoff to 
the unwinding executive is based on a five-month period.  If the ex-
ecutive were required to disclose the intended unwinding X months 
before the five-month period began, any inside information on which 
the executive was trading would have X more months to emerge and 
affect the stock price, making it more likely that the stock price used 
to calculate the payoff to the executive would be accurate. 
In addition, the disclosure of large or otherwise unusual sale or-
ders would intensify scrutiny of the firm and its managers.  An un-
usually large sale order, for example, would signal the possibility that 
the executive knows bad news is likely to emerge.  If further investiga-
tion suggests that the stock is overpriced, market participants will 
drive the price down even before the payoff period begins, reducing 
the total proceeds from the unwinding. 
Finally, an executive who sells on inside information is likely to be 
forced to make future sales at lower prices, even if those future sales are 
driven by liquidity or diversification reasons.  Currently, market profes-
sionals analyze insiders’ posttransaction trading reports to identify ex-
ecutives whose purchases and sales predict large price movements.  
These executives’ trades are used to figure out whether a particular 
stock is overpriced or underpriced.  Managers with nonpredictive trades 
attract far less attention.  Under advance disclosure, executives who sell 
before large price declines will subsequently face larger adjustments 
than executives who do not, regardless of their motives for these future 
trades.  These future adjustments should further reduce managers’ in-
sider trading profits and their incentives to trade on inside information 
in the first place. 
We are aware of only one firm, Ameritrade, that has ever indicated 
it would impose a pretrading disclosure requirement on its executives.86  
In early February 1999, ten Ameritrade insiders sold tens of thousands 
of shares as the stock price peaked shortly before a sharp decline.  To 
mollify angry shareholders, Ameritrade announced that, in the future, 
it would require insiders to announce in advance any plans to sell 
shares, including the number of shares they planned to sell.  Ameri-
trade’s chairman and co-CEO explained, “I feel that instituting a policy 
which ensures [that shareholders] know in advance when insiders in-
86 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 180-81 (citing Randall Smith & Danielle 
Sessa, Ameritrade Says Insiders’ Sales Must Now Be Announced First, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 
1999, at C1). 
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tend to sell stock is simply the right thing to do.”87  However, Ameri-
trade quietly canceled the policy before any executive traded.88 
d.  “Hands-Off” Arrangements 
While pretrading disclosure would further reduce executives’ abili-
ty to profit from their access to inside information, a “hands-off” ar-
rangement that left executives no discretion over when their equity is 
cashed out could eliminate such profits entirely.89  Under this ar-
rangement, restricted stock and stock options would be cashed out ac-
cording to a fixed, gradual, and preannounced schedule set when the 
equity was granted.  At least one firm has adopted the “hands-off” ap-
proach to its option compensation.  In 2007, Level 3 Communications 
filed a compensation plan with the SEC under which executives’ op-
tions are cash settled according to a predisclosed gradual schedule.90 
Hands-off equity leaves executives no discretion as to when they 
may unwind their equity.  As a result, executives compensated with 
such equity cannot use inside information to decide when to sell.  
Hands-off equity thus eliminates all the insider trading profits that ex-
ecutives make in connection with stock sales.  There is no other ar-
rangement as effective at reducing executives’ insider trading profits. 
Some may be concerned that hands-off arrangements would un-
desirably reduce executive equity holdings.  But if a corporate board 
identifies the desired level of executive equity ownership ex ante, it 
can design the hands-off plan to ensure that the executive always re-
tains that amount of equity.  Should changing circumstances make the 
optimal level of equity ownership higher than had been expected, the 
board can arrange for the executive to acquire additional equity (for 
example, by reducing cash compensation and issuing more hands-off 
equity).  Indeed, properly structured, hands-off arrangements could 
ensure that executives always have sufficient equity.91 
87 Id. 
88 See id. at 180-81. 
89 See Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 VAND. L. REV. 453, 468-70 (2008) (pro-
posing “hands-off” options as a means of reducing the costs to shareholders that arise 
when executives have the freedom to choose when to unwind their equity). 
90 See Level 3 Commc’ns, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 19 (Apr. 
18, 2007) (“[R]ecipients of these [stock-indexed securities] will not be able to volunta-
rily exercise [them] as they will settle automatically with value on the third anniversary 
of the date of the award or expire without value on that date.”). 
91 In addition to ensuring that executives retain a desirable amount of equity, 
hands-off equity might yield several collateral benefits.  For example, the practice would 
encourage managers to focus on running the business rather than timing their trades.  
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This brings us to our next principle: 
 
PRINCIPLE 7:  To the extent that executives have discretion over the timing 
of sales of equity incentives not subject to unwinding limitations, executives 
should announce sales in advance.  Alternatively, the unloading of executives’ 
equity incentives should be effected according to a prespecified schedule put in 
place when the equity is originally granted. 
III.  LIMITATIONS ON HEDGING AND DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS 
The preceding Parts have discussed how equity-based compensa-
tion should be designed to tie executive payoffs from equity-based 
compensation to long-term shareholder value.  For these arrange-
ments to produce their intended benefits, however, it is essential that 
executives not be able to use hedging and derivative transactions to 
undermine or circumvent them.  This Part discusses the limitations on 
such transactions that are important for firms to adopt. 
As we highlighted in Pay Without Performance, standard pay ar-
rangements have commonly failed to restrict the use of financial in-
struments that can weaken or eliminate entirely the incentive effects of 
equity-based instruments awarded as part of compensation arrange-
ments.92  Indeed, standard arrangements have failed to prohibit execu-
tives from entering into hedging transactions with respect to their own 
firms’ stock.  A study by Stewart Schwab and Randall Thomas of 375 
employment contracts collected by the Corporate Library found that 
none restricted the CEO from hedging her option grants.93 
A recent empirical study by Bettis, Bizjak, and Kalpathy confirms 
the significance of the problem we highlighted in Pay Without Perfor-
mance.94  The study examines executives’ disclosures to identify cases 
It would also reduce arbitrary differences in executives’ payoffs due to luck in timing 
transactions, increasing pay equity within the management team. 
92 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 176-77 (noting that boards often do not 
even request such restrictions).  
93 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment 
Contracts:  What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 240, 264 
(2006). 
94 Carr Bettis, John Bizjak & Swaminathan Kalpathy, Insiders’ Use of Hedging In-
struments:  An Empirical Examination (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364810.  For an earlier study on the prevalence of 
hedging instruments, see J. Carr Bettis, John M. Bizjak & Michael L. Lemmon, Mana-
gerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by 
Corporate Insiders, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 345 (2001). 
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in which executives hedged their stock positions in their firms.95  The 
study finds that, between 1996 and 2006, more than 1000 insiders 
hedged their stock positions.96  The average level of ownership hedged 
through the most common forms of hedging transactions was signifi-
cant, around thirty percent.97 
The Bettis, Bizjak, and Kalpathy study found that hedging transac-
tions were preceded by large abnormal positive price returns and of-
ten followed by large negative abnormal returns.98  This pattern is 
consistent with executives profiting by either using inside information 
to time their hedging transactions or using their influence over cor-
porate disclosure decisions to boost the price before entering the 
hedging transactions.  The researchers distinguish between hedging 
that is motivated by such use of inside information and influence over 
disclosures, which they view unfavorably, and hedging motivated by a 
desire to diversify risk, which they appear to view as legitimate.99  But 
hedging that is motivated solely by a desire to diversify risks is also 
problematic and should be prevented. 
Consider a board that awards an executive one million shares worth 
$10 each at the time of the award.  Suppose that the shares will vest at 
the end of the year and then be subject to restrictions on unloading 
that will prevent the executive from cashing out the shares for an addi-
tional three years.  The award is designed to provide the executive, dur-
ing the four subsequent years, with an incentive to increase the long-
term value of the firm’s shares.  Suppose also that the executive is not 
subject to any limitations on hedging and derivative transactions and 
that immediately following receipt of the award the executive sells short 
one million of the company’s shares (or enters into any other economi-
cally equivalent derivative transaction), pocketing $10 million.  The ex-
ecutive then waits four years and delivers the now freely transferable 
shares awarded by the company to close the short position. 
In this case, even though the company has awarded stock that the 
executive cannot unwind for four years, the executive will not have any 
economic exposure to changes in the firm’s value during the four years 
following the equity grant.  The executive will be in the same situation 
that she would have been in had the board granted her a $10 million 
95 Bettis, Bizjack & Kalpathy, supra note 94, at 3. 
96 Id. at 11. 
97 Id. at 13. 
98 Id. at 20-21. 
99 See id. at 2 n.5 (discussing arguments that hedging transactions are “benign and 
are used for diversification”). 
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cash payment rather than an equity award with a grant-date value of $10 
million.  Converting the $10 million equity award into a fixed $10 mil-
lion cash payment enables the executive to avoid uncertainty and risk-
bearing costs.  Thus, even if the executive does not have information 
suggesting that the value of the firm’s stock will fall below $10 a share, 
she may well benefit from entering into this hedging transaction. 
From the perspective of the firm and its shareholders, however, 
there is no reason to allow the executive to convert the $10 million eq-
uity award into a $10 million cash payment.  The board could have 
granted the executive a $10 million cash payment in lieu of the $10 mil-
lion equity award, but chose not to do so.  This choice was presumably 
based on a desire to tie the executive’s compensation to her perfor-
mance and thereby provide desirable incentives to increase shareholder 
value.  Indeed, the use of equity instruments as the means of compensa-
tion might have led the board to offer a higher level of pay than if the 
executive had been paid only in cash.  Given the board’s choice of an 
equity-based pay structure and its setting of pay levels in light of this 
chosen structure, the executive should not be permitted to change the 
structure unilaterally by using hedging and derivative transactions.100 
The problem of executives’ use of hedging and derivative transac-
tions is likely to become even more important in the future.  As we dis-
cussed, past pay arrangements have commonly allowed executives to 
freely unload all vested equity-based awards, and concerns about hedg-
ing and derivatives have thus been limited to their use in undoing the 
effects of awarded, but not yet vested, options and shares.  If firms begin 
to limit  the unloading of vested equity awards, along the lines we have 
proposed or otherwise, the set of circumstances in which executives have 
incentives to use hedges and derivatives to undo the effects of these ar-
rangements will expand substantially. 
In other words, the adoption of restrictions on the unwinding of 
equity-based awards, as well as the adoption of restrictions aimed at pre-
venting gaming, make it all the more important limit the use of hedg-
ing and derivative transactions by top executives.  Without such limita-
tions, the restrictions on unloading and gaming can easily be undone.  
No matter how strong the restrictions and limitations are in theory, they 
will not do much if executives can circumvent them in practice. 
100 For a formal model of how hedging can undermine incentives, see Mariano 
Tommasi & Federico Weinschelbaum, Principal-Agent Contracts Under the Threat of Insur-
ance, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 379 (2007). 
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Thus, as we argued in Pay Without Performance, it is especially im-
portant to prohibit hedging and derivative transactions that reduce 
executives’ exposure to fluctuations in the company’s stock price.101  
For these prohibitions to be effective, they must be cast broadly 
enough to encompass all transactions, no matter how they are labeled, 
which have the perverse effect of undoing some or all of the intended 
effects of the company’s equity-based arrangements.  Firms should ac-
cordingly adhere to the following principle: 
 
PRINCIPLE 8:  Executives should be prohibited from engaging in any hedg-
ing, derivative, or other transaction with an equivalent economic effect that 
could reduce or limit the extent to which declines in the company’s stock price 
would lower the executive’s payoffs or otherwise materially dilute the performance 
incentives created by the company’s equity-based compensation arrangements. 
 
This antihedging principle was incorporated into the policies of 
the Office of the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation.  
Kenneth Feinberg, the Special Master, was charged with supervising 
the executive pay decisions of several firms that received special assis-
tance from the U.S. government.102  The determination decisions is-
sued to the companies subject to the Special Master’s supervision re-
quire the companies to adopt policies containing antihedging 
prohibitions in accordance with the above principle.103 
A small number of companies have announced antihedging poli-
cies in their annual proxy statements.  Among companies reporting 
antihedging policies in their 2009 annual proxy statements were Proc-
ter & Gamble, Aetna, and Exxon Mobil.  Some of these policies ap-
pear comprehensive, banning the use of any derivatives to hedge.  For 
example, Procter & Gamble “prohibits pledging, collars, short sales, 
101 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 191. 
102 For a description of the Special Master’s mandate and work, see Executive Compen-
sation:  How Much is Too Much?:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government 
Reform, 111th Cong. (Oct. 28, 2009) (statement of Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Master for 
TARP Executive Compensation), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/ 
TESTIMONY-Feinberg.pdf.  
103 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Mas-
ter for TARP Executive Compensation Written Testimony Before the House Financial 
Services Committee (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ 
tg565.htm (reporting that one of the principles used to evaluate pay at subject firms was 
that “employees should be prohibited from engaging in any hedging, derivative or oth-
er transactions that undermine the long-term performance incentives created by a 
company’s compensation structures”). 
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hedging investments and other derivative transactions involving Com-
pany stock.”104  Similarly, Aetna prohibits “all employees (including 
executives) and Directors from engaging in hedging strategies using 
puts, calls or other types of derivative securities based upon the value 
of our Common Stock.”105 
In contrast, some of the policies appear to be too narrow to be ef-
fective.  Exxon Mobil only “prohibits all employees, including execu-
tives, from entering into put or call options on Exxon Mobil common 
stock or futures contracts on oil or gas.”106  Such a policy does not pro-
hibit executives from entering into other derivative transactions not in-
volving actual puts and calls that may have economically equivalent or 
similar hedging effects.  For example, the policy does not prevent Ex-
xon Mobil executives from entering into swap agreements that enable 
them to offload the risk associated with holding company stock.  And 
Exxon Mobil executives may have a particularly strong incentive to en-
ter into such hedging arrangements because, as we discussed earlier, 
they are subject to relatively substantial long-term holding require-
ments.  To ensure that executives do not evade these holding require-
ments, Exxon Mobil should modify its hedging policy to prohibit the 
use of a broader set of hedging and derivative transactions that could 
undermine the incentive effects of its long-term holding requirements. 
Importantly, to prevent limitations on unwinding from becoming 
meaningless, firms should curtail executives’ ability to engage in cer-
tain hedging and derivative transactions as long as the executives are 
subject to unwinding restrictions.  As discussed earlier, it would be de-
sirable to limit the ability of executives to unwind equity-based awards 
not just during their years of service but also for some time after their 
departure.  In such a case, the limitations on hedging and derivative 
transactions should also continue after retirement until the executive 
is no longer subject to unwinding limitations. 
If an executive can hedge her unliquidated equity as soon as she 
retires, she is in the same position as an executive who expects to sell 
her stock upon retirement.  In both cases, the executive’s wealth will 
not depend on how the stock performs during the period between re-
tirement and the cash-out date, but only on the retirement-date price.  
Thus, when an executive can hedge her position upon retiring, she 
may have an incentive to depart too early and to adopt an excessively 
104 Procter & Gamble Co., Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 36, at 21. 
105 Aetna Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 45 (Apr. 22, 2009). 
106 Exxon Mobil Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 30, at 26. 
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short-term focus in the period leading up to retirement.  For postre-
tirement limitations on equity unwinding to function properly, firms 
must contractually prohibit executives from hedging their equity posi-
tions after they retire. 
Before closing, we should note the enforcement issues involved in 
implementing an antihedging prohibition.  Such a prohibition in an 
executive’s employment contract is not self-enforcing.  While the com-
pany may retain control over equity instruments awarded to an execu-
tive and thereby easily impose limitations on unwinding, an executive 
may use her personal account to engage in various hedging and deriva-
tive transactions.  For executives subject to filing requirements under 
the securities laws, the company may be able to rely on such filings to 
determine whether the executive is acting consistently with its anti-
hedging prohibition.  However, some top executives may not be sub-
ject to such filing requirements, and, moreover, executives are general-
ly no longer subject to such requirements after they leave the firm. 
Thus, at least for executives who retire but remain subject to un-
winding limitations for a certain period, firms should take steps en-
force whatever antihedging prohibitions they have in place.  For ex-
ample, firms could hold the blocked stock of a retired executive in an 
escrow account and, before releasing the stock on the cash-out date, 
require the executive to file an affidavit certifying that she has not en-
gaged in any hedging transactions before the cash-out date, either 
during or before retirement. 
CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008–2009, there is a 
growing recognition among firms, investors, and public officials that 
equity-based compensation awarded to the top executives of public 
firms should be tied to long-term results and that rewards for short-term 
gains that may prove illusory can produce substantial distortions.  In 
this Article, we have sought to contribute to the reform of executive pay 
by providing a framework of analysis for understanding these defects 
and by putting forward a set of arrangements for remedying them. 
We have explained how executives should be incentivized to focus 
on the long term rather than the short run.  Managers should be 
“blocked” from cashing out their equity for a specified period of time 
after vesting.  Importantly, firms should avoid retirement-based hold-
ing requirements that could distort executives’ decisions to retire and 
undermine their incentive to focus on long-term value as they ap-
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proach retirement.  Instead, equity-based awards should be subject to 
grant-based and aggregate limitations on unwinding along the lines 
we put forward. 
We have also explained how firms should structure compensation 
arrangements to prevent gaming with respect to equity-based awards 
either at the front end or the back end.  Finally, we have stressed the 
importance of adopting effective prohibitions on hedging and deriva-
tive transactions that can undo and undermine the beneficial incen-
tive effects of long-term equity-based plans.  We hope that our frame-
work and prescriptions will be useful to firms, compensation experts, 
investors, policymakers, and regulators in their ongoing efforts to im-
prove executive compensation. 
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APPENDIX:  PRINCIPLES FOR TYING EQUITY COMPENSATION  
TO LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE 
PRINCIPLE 1:  Executives should not be free to unload restricted 
stock and options as soon as they vest, except to the extent necessary 
to cover any taxes arising from vesting. 
 
PRINCIPLE 2:  Executives’ ability to unwind their equity incentives 
should not be tied to retirement. 
 
PRINCIPLE 3:  After allowing for any cashing out necessary to pay 
any taxes arising from vesting, equity-based awards should be subject 
to grant-based limitations on unwinding that allow them to be un-
wound only gradually, beginning some time after vesting. 
 
PRINCIPLE 4:  All equity-based awards should be subject to aggregate 
limitations on unwinding so that, in each year (including a specified 
number of years after retirement), an executive may unwind no more 
than a specified percentage of her equity incentives that is not subject 
to grant-based limitations on unwinding at the beginning of the year. 
 
PRINCIPLE 5:  The timing of equity awards to executives should not 
be discretionary.  Rather, such grants should be made only on prespe-
cified dates. 
 
PRINCIPLE 6:  To reduce the potential for gaming, the terms and 
amount of posthiring equity awards should not be based on the grant-
date stock price. 
 
PRINCIPLE 7:  To the extent that executives have discretion over 
the timing of sales of equity incentives not subject to unwinding limi-
tations, executives should announce sales in advance.  Alternatively, 
the unloading of executives’ equity incentives should be effected ac-
cording to a prespecified schedule put in place when the equity is 
originally granted. 
 
PRINCIPLE 8:  Executives should be prohibited from engaging in 
any hedging, derivative, or other transaction with an equivalent econ- 
omic effect that could reduce or limit the extent to which declines in 
the company’s stock price would lower the executive’s payoffs or oth-
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erwise materially dilute the performance incentives created by the 
company’s equity-based compensation arrangements. 
 
